United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPENDIX

76-1020

B Ns

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
----X
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee

Docket No. 76-1020

-against-

FRANKLIN WILLIAM GRASSI and RAUL ARCE

Appellants

JOINT APPENDIX

JOHN C. CORBETT
Attorney for Appellant
FRANKLIN WILLIAM GRASSI
Office & P.O. Address
66 Court Street
Brooklyn, New York 11201



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behalf enters a plea of guilty to count 2 - sentence adjd without

date.

75CR 533

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
7-28-75 7/28/75	Stenographers transcript filed dated July 17, 1975. Before MISHLER, CH.J Case called- Deft not present- counsel present-Case adjd to 7/29/75 at 10:30 A.M. for trial
7/29/75	Before WATSON, J Case called - Defts and counsel present - Motions for bai reduction granted - hatixxandused bail at at \$25,000.00 surety bond 10%
	cash as to deft Grassi and Arce- case adjd to 8/25/75 at 9:30 A.M. for tri
7/29/75	By SCHIFFMAN, MAG Orders for acceptance of cash bail filed (GRASSI and ARC
7/31/75	75 M 1033 is inserted in CR file(IND)
8/6/75	75 M 1297 and 1298 is inserted in CR file.
	BeforeMISHLER, CH.J Case called- sentence adjd without date(GARRO)
9-5-75	
9-5-75	
	with counsels - Nov. 10, 1975 for Trial.
11-10-7	5 Before MISHLER, CH J - adid to Nov. 17, 1975 for trial
11-14-7	5 Defts Memorandum of Law filed on behalf of ARCE & GRASSI in support
	of defts objection to the admission of evidence relating to alleged
	subsequent similar cimes of both defts.
L1/17/75	Before MISHLER, CH.J. Case called Defts Grassi and Arce present with counsel-hearing on motion to suppress held-hearing concluded - motion to
	suppress denied- Trial ordered and begun-jurors selected and sworn-court
-	remanded deft Grassi on application of his counsel-Deft Arce's bail modifi to extent that he remains at home except to come to court or to prepare hi
	defense with counsel-trial contd to 11/18/75 at 9:45 A.M.
.1/18/75	Before MISHLER, CH.J .= Case called- defts and counsel present- trial resume
Size.	govt rests-motion by defts for judgment of acquittal denied-bail increase
	to \$50,000.00 surety Co. bond as to deft Arce-both defts rest-trial contd
5	to 11/19/75 at 10:00 A.M.
11-19-7	Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - defts Grassi & Arce present with
	attys - trial resumed - at 12:30 PM the Jury retired for deliberations
	at 5:20 PM the jury returned and asked to suspend for the day and to retu
	tomorrow for further deliberations - trial contd to 11-20-75 @ 9:45 am.
11-19-7	By MISHLER, CH J - Order of sustenance filed - lunch 15 persons.
11-20-75	By MISHLER, CH J - Order of sustenance filed - Lunch-14 persons.
-20-75	Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - deft GRASSI & ARCE present with attys - trial remained - at 10:00 am the jury resumed deliberations - Order of sustenance signed for lunch - at 11:40 am the jury returned and render-
33	ed a verdict of guilty on count 2 as to both defts - jury polled and jury discharged - trial concluded - jury did not have to arrive at a verdict
	discharged - trial concluded - jury did not have to arrive at a vertice

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
	on count 1 as instructed by the Court - all motions reserved unt time of sentence - bail exonerated as to defts GRASSI & ARC
	sentences adjd without dat
11-20-7	By MISHLER, CH J - Order releasing bail filed (defts Grassi and Arce) 2 Orders
12-9-75	Voucher for Expert Services filed.
12-9-75	4 stenographers transcripts filed (pgs 1 to 548A)
1-9-76	Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - deft Grasso & counsel John Combett present - deft sentenced to imprisonment for 15 years
	on count 2 Clerk to file Notice of Appeal without fee.
1-9-76	Judgment & Commitment filed - certified copies to Marshal.
1-9-76	Notice of Appeal filed (no fee) (GRASSI)
1-9-76	1 1 11 to of Motion of Anneal Mai FO CO
	the Court of Appeals. (GRASSI)
1-9-76	Before MISHLER, CH J - case called - deft ARCE & counsel George
	Sheinberg present. Deft sentenced to imprisonment for 15 years;
	Clerk to file Notice of Appeal without fee.
1-9-76	Judgment and Commitment filed - certified copies to Marshal
	(ARCE)
1-9-76	Notice of Appeal filed without fee (ARCE) **Heighertxereix@smmi Docket entries and duplicate of Notice of
1-9-76	Appeal mailed to the C of A (ARCE)
L-12-76	Judgment & Commitment retd and filed - deft grassi delivered to MCC.
1 1/ 7	6 Judgment & Commitment retd and filed - deft ARCE delivered
1-14-7	
	to MCC.
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JD:RA:1j1 . #753,025

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

75 CR 533

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- against -

JUL 8 1975

JOSEPH LOUIS GARRO,
FRANKLIN WILLIAM GRASSI and p.m...
RAUL ARCE,

Cr. No. (T. 18, U.S.C., \$\$2113(a)(d) and 2)

Defendants.

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

COUNT ONE

On or about the 14th day of March 1975, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants JOSEPH LOUIS GARRO, FRANKLIN WILLIAM GPASSI and RAUL ARCE knowingly and wilfully, by force, violence, and intimidation, did take from the person and presence of employees of the Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association, 31-24 Ditmars Boulevard, Queens, New York, approximately Twenty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-six Dollars and Seventy-two Cents (\$20,266.72), in United States currency, which money was in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the said Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association the deposits of which Savings and Loan Association were then and there insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2113(a) and 2).

COUNT TWO

On or about the 14th day of March 1975, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants JOSEPH LOUIS GARRO, FRANKLIN WILLIAM GRASSI and RAUL ARCE knowingly and wilfully, by force, violence, and intimidation, did take from the person and presence of employees of the Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association, 31-24 Ditmars Boulevard, Queens, New York, approximately Twenty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-six

Dollars and Seventy-two Cents (\$20,266.72), in United States currency, which money was in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the said Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association the deposits of which Savings and Loan Association were then and there insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and in commission of this act and offense the defendants JOSEPH LOUIS GARRO, FRANKLIN WILLIAM GRASSI and RAUL ARCE did assault and place in jeopardy the life of the said bank employees, as well as the lives of other persons present by the use of a dangerous weapon. (Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2113(d) and 2).

A TRUE BILL.

Fire Land B. Chreme

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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CHARGE OF THE HONORABLE JACOB MISHLER, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

(At 11:30 a.m. Judge Mishler began his charge.)

THE COURT: Madam Forelady and ladies and gentlemen of the jury:

We have reached that int in the trial where it becomes my duty to charge you on the applicable law. I think a good starting place is to understand the three major elements in a jury trial, the three areas of participation:

One is the activity of the lawyers.

The lawyers are partial, they are cotagonists,
they represent clients and their zeal in the
defense of their clients is understandable.

But we must recognize that they do represent a
cause and that they do speak from a particular
point of view. That is true of the lawyer for
the Government and the lawyers for the defendants.

The Court and the jury, on the other
hand, are dispassionate, objective and impartial.

It is the only way we can have a fair jury trial.

The lawyers develop the evidence through

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their zeal because they are adversaries contesting over the issues of fact.

The Court and jury are objective and dispassionate and impartial.

The role of the jury is different than that of the Court. The jury is described as the judges of the facts. The Court is described as the judge of the law. There is a distinct line of demarcation in the function and authority between the Court and the jury. You and you alone will decide what happened in this case as it relates to the charges in the indictment, that is specifically whether the Government proved that these defendants participated in the bank robbery, the armed bank robbery of the Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association on Ditmars Boulevard in Astoria, Queens. You will do that, of course, in accordance with the law as the Court charges it. Upon reaching a determination on the findings of fact and upon applying the law as the Court charges it to those facts, you will then reach the ultimate determination as to the guilt or innocence of each defendant on the charges in the indictment.

I say the charges in the indictment,
later I will show you that there are two
counts, but they are in effect one count:

One is the graver charge, the other is the

lesser charge, they both concern the same

avent.

to your separate and individual consideration.

You will determine after careful consideration of all the evidence the guilt of each defendant based on the evidence against that defendant.

Though this is a joint trial, the evidence must be appraised separately against each defendant.

I think understanding the function and the authority of each participant in the trial and respecting the authority of the other, each of us can more effectively perform our own duties.

We start in all criminal trials with a presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence is a strong presumption in Anglo-American jurisprudence, which in effect clothes the defendant with the presumption of innocence. It means that you must conclude at the outset

of the trial that both defendants are innocent of the charges in the indictment and that presumption is enough to acquit a defendant.

In order to overcome the presumption, the Government must prove the guilt of the defendant by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, so that if the Government fails in sustaining that burden then the presumption of innocence prevails and is enough to acquit a defendant.

Now, a reasonable doubt is a doubt which a reasonable person has after weighing all the evidence and considering all the evidence in the case. It is a doubt based on reason, log.; common sense, it is a doubt that is present from examining the record and a doubt that arises from the state of the record. It is not a vague, speculative or imaginary doubt; it is not a doubt based on suspicion, conjecture or surmise. It is not the kind of a doubt that a juror might have because of the unpleasant task in finding a defendant guilty of the crime charged. A reasonable doubt is the kind of a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in a matter of importance to himself or

herself. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, is proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it unhesitatingly in the most important of your own affairs.

The Government is not required to prove the guilt of the defendant to a mathematical certainty, it is not required to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond all doubt. The Government's burden is heavy.

It is to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Government need not prove that

every bit of evidence offered in the trial

before you is true beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Government's burden is to prove all the

essential elements of the crime charged beyond

a reasonable doubt.

Later in the charge I will enumerate the essential elements of the crimes charged here.

As I said, the defendant need not produce any evidence, the defendant has the right to rely on the failure of the Government

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to prove his guilt.

Throughout this charge I may use the singular or the plural; in both cases, of course, it means both unless I single a defendant out for a particular charge.

What is evidence:

Evidence is the method which the law uses to prove a disputed fact or to disprove a disputed fact.

Evidence is generally classified as direct evidence or as circumstantial evidence, sometimes called indirect evidence.

Direct evidence is the testimony of witnesses as to what the witness saw or heard. Circumstantial evidence is a method of proving or disproving a fact by the jury drawing reasonable inferences based on experience and common sense from established facts.

I have gotten accustomed to make the distinction clear through an example, and the example I use usually is a hypothetical situation:

Let us assume the jury was sitting here as a jury to determine liability inapersonal injury action, let us assume that Plaintiff A

claims that Defendant B was negligent in that the defendant passed a stop sign without stopping and struck the plaintiff.

Let us assume B was driving his car along a particular smet near an intersection where the stop sign was erected.

Now, if my courtroom deputy and myself were at the corner at the particular time and place, we might be witnesses to the accident, each of us giving different types of testimony concerning the same issue of fact.

The important thing is to identify the disputed issue of fact. In this case the plaintiff claims the defendant passed a stop sign without stopping. The defendant says, no, I stopped and then I proceeded.

Let us assume that I was facing the roadway speaking with my courtroom deputy and he had his back to the roadway and his back to the stop sign. If I were called to the stand to testify concerning that event, I might very well say:

I was talking with Mr. Adler, my courtroom deputy, I noticed the defendant's motor

wehicle proceeding at about 65 or 70 miles an hour, he was driving a white Cadillac, and I saw him pass the stop sign at about the same speed and continue past it and strike the plaintiff.

Now, that is direct evidence on that issue.

My courtroom deputy didn't see the car pass the stop sign, but he is competent to testify concerning the circumstances from which a jury might draw the reasonable inference that that is what happened.

with me a car entered the area of his peripheral vision, he noticed that it was proceeding at about 70 miles an hour, he lost sight of it for about 150 feet and two or three seconds later when he turned left he saw the motor vehicle proceed at the same rate of speed and saw it strike the plaintiff.

Now I think on the basis of his testimony you might draw the fair and reasonable inference, if you believe his testimony, that the motor vehicle passed the stop sign without stopping;

that it traversed about 150 feet in two or three seconds.

Those are the circumstances from which the jury would draw a reasonable inference based upon experience and common sense.

Of course the jury here is equipped with the experience and good common sense that maturity gives us, and I am sure that you will deal with the evidence in reaching your determinations as mature citizens and you are free to use, you are invited to use your good common sense and experience.

The record in the case, the evidence in the case is the sworn testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits received in evidence, the facts which may have been admitted or stipulated and the facts which the Court took judicial notice.

If you recall, I said that I took judicial notice that March 13,1975 was a Thursday.

I think it is important to understand what is not evidence in the case to more clearly define what is evidence in the case:

The statements made by lawyers in their openings and in their summations is not evidence.

As I indicated at the outset, they serve a very useful purpose. In the openings, they, the lawyers, told you what their positions were, and I suspect it served the purpose, it made it easier for you to follow the testimony as it came in.

The closing arguments which argue the evidence in the case and sharpened the issues told you what the lawyers regard as the important issues in the case. The defendants argued theories of exculpability, in effect they said the Government failed to prove the guilt of the defendants, each one arguing separately, of course, and that is the determination which you will make:

Did the Government prove the defendants guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendants said, no, and offered theories of exculpability, arguing that the defendants were not guilty. The Government on the other hand argued theories of inculpability, arguing that the Government did prove the guilt of the defendants by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

You are obviously not going to take

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all the arguments by both sides. That would be impossible. You may decide that one of the arguments made by counsel or more than one of the arguments or all the arguments made by counsel are attractive, and that, too, is a tool to lead you to the truth. You are free to reject any or all of the arguments made by counsel. Of course, again, they are helpful tools, but they are not evidence.

You will recall that at least one lawyer read from the transcript, and I assume that that portion he read is quite accurate, I don't find any intentional distortion of the evidence, but he in effect based it on his, the lawyer's recollection and it is your recollection that counts.

The statements of the Court:

I do not recall making any statements, but if I did it is not evidence. I am just here as the judge of the law. I am not here to tell you how to decide the case. I have no opinion, one way or the other, in this case.

I leave it solely with you.

While I am at it, I might advise you

any special significance to the questions that I asked. I am a lawyer in robes and at times when I hear some testimony the issue appears fudgy to me, a little unclear. It may have been perfectly clear to you but I just assume that if I don't quite understand it maybe you don't - - I could be 100% wrong. I ask the questions only to clear up any area that I find is a little unclear.

At times evidence was stricken from the record. Well, it is not in the record, and as I directed the Reporter to strike it from the record physically, so I ask you to figuratively strike it from your recollection and your consideration.

At times objection was sustained to a question asked. The question was not answered and you may not speculate on what the answer might have been if the witness were allowed to answer, and this on the same theory that it is not in the record and you may only consider what is in the record.

I would like to distinguish between

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inference and presumption, I have used both terms. An inference is a conclusion which reason and common sense leads the jury to draw from the facts which have been established by the evidence in the case. The example of that is the method of proving or disproving a disputed fact through circumstantial evidence.

A presumption, on the other hand, is a conclusion which the law requires the jury to make and continues only so long as it is not overcome or outweighed by evidence in the case to the contrary. Unless and until the presumption is so outweighed, the jury is bound to find in accordance with the presumption - - and of course the presumption of that is the presumption of innocence.

You, the jurors, are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses, which means the believability of their testimony and the weight their testimony deserves.

Scrutinize the testimony given and the circumstances under which each witness testified and every matter in evidence which tends to show whether a witness is worthy of belief.

Consider each witness' intelligence, consider the motive of each witness and his state of mind; why is the witness testifying, what is the state of mind.

Take into consideration the demeanor

of the witness on the witness stand, take into

consideration the witness' own ability to

observe the matters as to which he has testified,

whether he has impressed you with having an

accurate recollection on those matters.

Also, the relationship each witness might bear to either side of the case, the manner in which each witness might be affected by the outcome of the case, the extent to which a witness is corroborated or contradicted by other testimony in the case.

The witness Joseph Garro testified that
he participated in the crime charged. His
statement that he participated classifies him as
an alleged accomplice. Alleged accomplices are
not incompetent to testify because of their participation in the crime charged. On the contrary,
the testimony of an alleged accomplice alone if
believed by the jury to be true beyond a reasonable

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a verdict of guilty, even though not corroborated or supported by other evidence in the case.

However the jury should keep in mind that such testimony is to be received with caution and weighed with great care. You shouldn't convict a defendant on the uncorroborated testimony of an alleged accomplice unless you believe that testimony to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.

The testimony of the witness may be discredited or impeached by showing that the witness has been convicted of a felony, that is a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of years. Prior conviction does not render a witness incompetent to testify, but again is merely a circumstance which you may consider in determining the credibility of the witness. It is the province of the jury alone to determine the effect that a felony conviction has on the testimony of a witness.

Some evidence has been offered to show that at some time prior to the witness taking the stand the witness made a statement that is inconsistent with the testimony given before you:

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It is called impeaching testimony. I think it is obvious to most of us that witnesses intend to tell the truth and attempt to tell the truth but in retelling an incident tell it differently each time with the retelling. If a witness on recounting a version of what happened a number of times said it exactly the same way, in exactly the same language with exactly the same pauses and gestures, you would have reason to question the veracity of this witness, you would think it was well rehearsed. On the other hand, there are times when we recognize a prior version as being entirely different or materially different than the one told the second time or a third time. At times there might just be error, something overlooked, something left out: At times they are intentional lies. Well, the jury and the jury alone determines, first, whether any prior statement was inconsistent with the testimony given at the trial. The jury and the jury alone is to determine whether it is inconsistent as to a material fact and having determined that, the jury alone determines

the effect a prior inconsistent statement has on the testimony given before you.

in a criminal case to take the witness stand and testify. No presumption of guilt may be raised and no unfavorable inference may be drawn of any kind by the failure of a defendant to testify. A defendant who is previously charged may rely on the failure of the Government to prove its case. It would be improper for you to discuss the failure of the defendant to testify during your deliberations.

testified under oath falsely as to a material fact, you have the right to disregard all that witness' testimony on the ground that that witness is unworthy of belief. On the other hand, you have the right, if you wish, to reject -- well, the obligation to reject that portion of the testimony that you recognize is false and to take that portion under consideration that you find credible. The principle merely underscores the wide discretion the jury has in weighing and assessing credibility.

In this case the witness Henry Faison, who was in charge of security at Korvettes testified as follows in answer to the question put by Mr. Appleby:

"Now, I'd like you to look around this courtroom very carefully and tell the members of the jury whether you recognize anybody in this courtroom as being similar in appearance to one of the men that you saw that day that caught your attention."

And the answer was:

"The gentleman with the plaid jacket."

He pointed to the defendant Raul Arce.

He also testified that he picked out a picture, it is Government's Exhibit Number 1, and he said it in answer to the following question:

"Did you pick out any one of these
photographs as being similar to the
appearance of the man you saw through
the window that day?"

The answer:

"This one right here."

And he picked out that exhibit,

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Exhibit Number 1.

Now, this is called identification testimony, and identification testimony is an impression or belief, an impression by the witness, and its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time he said he saw the individual and to make a reliable identification later.

In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the following:

Whether the witness had the capacity and adequate opportunity to observe the party he pointed out. This will depend on all the circumstances at the time the witness observed the party pointed out, this includes how long or short a time the witness saw the individual, how far or how close the witness was from the individual, the lighting conditions at the time, the position from which the witness viewed the individual, the emotional state of the witness at the time. Take into consideration the strength of the identification, was the

witness absolutely sure, reasonable sure or in such serious doubt as to the resemblance to the offender or to the party identified that the identification is worthless.

Scrutinize all the circumstances under which the identification was made prior to trial. If the indentification was through a spread of photographs, take into consideration when the identification was made, was it soon after the crime was committed or how long a time had elapsed. Did the witness pick the accused out from a group similar to the person identified?

Now we turn to the charge in the indictment.

I said "charge" in the singular, but I will

read two counts. When I read these two counts,

I am going to ask you to keep in mind that

when I read the second count it will be read exactly

like the first count, verbatim, except for the

last portion, and that has special significance.

Count One charges:

"On or about the 14th day of March,
1975, within the Eastern District of New York,

the defendants Joseph Louis Carro, Franklin
William Grassi and Paul Arce knowingly and
willfully, by force, violence and intimidation,
did take from the person and presence of
employees of the Astoria Federal Savings & Loan
Association, 31-24 Ditmars Boulevard, Queens,
New York, approximately \$20,266.72, in United
States currency, which money was in the care,
custody, control, management and possession of
the said Astoria Federal Savings & Loan
Association the deposits of which savings and
loan association were then and there insured
by the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance
Corporation."

That is Count One, and it cites a certain section that I will read later, it cites Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2113(a) and 2.

I will read Section 2113(a) and you will find some of the language in the section is incorporated in the count.

Now here is Count Two, and as I say, it reads exactly like Count One for the first portion.

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Count Two:

"On or about the 14th day of March, 1975, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants Joseph Louis Garro, Franklin William Grassi and Raul Arce knowingly and willfully, by force, violence and intimidation, did take from the person and presence of employees of the Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association, 31-24 Ditmars Boulevard, Queens, New York, approximately \$20,266.72, in United States currency, which money was in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the said Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association the deposits of which savings and loan association were then and there insured by the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation" - - and that is as far as Count One went, and this is the addition:

"and in commission of this act and offense the defendants Joseph Louis Garro, Franklin William Grassi and Raul Arce did assault and place in jeopardy the lives of the said bank employees, as well as the lives of other persons present by the use of a dangerous

weapon."

This is in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2113(d) and 2.

So you see, the addition referred to is placing lives in jeopardy and assaulting with a dangerous weapon.

It is significant because Count Two
is considered the graver of the offenses
because it is something additional to the crime
charged in Count One, it has an additional
element. That is why when I give you the case
for consideration, I will ask you to consider
Count Two first to determine whether the Government proved Count Two beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the Government proved Count Two, then you
won't even consider Count One, but you will
consider Count One if you find the defendant
or defendants not guilty in Count Two; as I
say, then you will consider Count One.

The charge in the indictment or the charges in the indictment, whichever you prefer, is based on a statute. Most of our Federal laws is codified and Title 18 is entitled, "Crimes and Criminal Procedure." It is the

Congress who determines what is a crime.

This is what the statute says in pertinent part:

"Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management or possession of, any bank, or any savings and loan association," commits the crime.

That is 2113(a).

There is another subdivision that adds the graver element and makes the graver crime, and it says this:

"Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in Subsection (a), assaults any person or outs in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device," commits the graver offense.

Now a bank is defined as any member of the Federal Reserve System, any bank, banking association, trust company, savings bank, or other banking institution organized or operating

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under the laws of the United States.

The Government must prove the following essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and I am going to Count One first, and I will repeat the first four elements when I come to Count Two, they will be exactly the same:

One, That on or about March 14, 1975

the defendant, and I say consider each one
separately, first the defendant Frank William
Grassi in one case then the defendant Raul Arce,
by force, violence or intimidation took from
the person or presence of the teller of the
Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association the
sum of approximately \$20,266.72. The Government
does not have to prove the \$20,266.72, if the
Government proves it was approximately \$12,000
then it has proved the sum taken;

Two, Doing such acts knowingly and willfully;

And, third, That the Astoria Federal
Savings and Loan Association was a savings and
loan association insured by the Federal Savings
Loan Association Insurance Corporation.

So the Government must prove those three essential elements of the crime charged to sustain its burden in Count One.

Now in Count Two, taking into consideration the additional element, and I will repeat what has to be proved in Count Two, I will try to use the same words but you see I am charging from just brief notes so it may not be the same language but the substance will be the same, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt;

One, That on or about the 14th day of
March, 1975 the defendant Franklin William
Grassi, and you consider his case, the defendant
Raul Arce, and you consider his case, by force,
violence and intimidation took from the person
and presence of the tellers of the Astoria
Federal Savings & Loan Association approximately
\$20,226.72, which money was in the care, custody,
control and management or possession of the
Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association;

Two, That such acts were performed knowingly and willfully;

Three, That the Astoria Federal Savings

& Loan Association was a savings and loan association insured by the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation;

Four, and this is the additional element, the act or acts of assaulting or putting in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device while engaged in stealing such money from the bank as charged.

Now in every criminal case there is an element, an essential element of the crime, intent. It is expressed in the statute by the use of a phrase, "knowingly and willfully."

"Knowingly " means that while performing the act the defendant was aware of what he was doing, that it wasn't pure accident, mistake or any other innocent reason. An act is done "willfully" when it is done voluntarily and intentionally, understanding that it is a violation of law. To take "by intimidation," means to take by putting the employees in fear of bodily harm. Now such fear must arise from the willful conduct of the accused rather than from the mere temperamental timidity of the

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employee.

The definition of assault upon a person is a willful attempt or threat to inflict injury upon the person of another when coupled with an apparent present ability to do so, or any intentional display of force such as would give the victim reason to fear or expect immediate bodily harm.

The definition of the phrase, "to put in jeopardy the life of a person by use of a dangerous weapon or device," and, first, a dangerous weapon or device includes anything capable of being readily operated, manipulated, wielded, or otherwise used by one person to inflict severe bodily harm or injury upon another person. So, an operable firearm such as a handgun which is capable of firing a bullet may be found to be a dangerous weapon or device.

To "put in jeopardy the life" of another person "by the use of a dangerous weapon or device," means, then, to expose such person to the risk of death.

You will shortly be excused to deliberate

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on the matter before you. As I indicated,
you will first consider whether the Government
has proved all the essential elements of the
crime charged in Count Two. If you find the
Government has not, then you will go to Count
One. If you find the defendant, and this
refers to either or both defendants, not guilty
of Count Two, then you will consider Count One
and you will arrive at a determination as to
the guilt or innocence of both defendants as to
Count One.

During your deliberations, you may have occasion to ask the Court to read some of the testimony. It has been transcribed.

Make any request for any information through your foreman.

If you want to see any of the exhibits, just write a note. If you want to see a specific exhibit, then signify so. If you want to see all the exhibits, I will send them all in.

There were some exhibits that were marked for identification. If they were marked only for identification and not in evidence, they are not a part of the record. So when you

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ask for exhibits, I cannot send in matters that are not in the record.

when you send a note, don't ask me to answer any questions. For example, frequently I get a note asking me what the witness testified about a certain matter. Well, I cannot tell you that, this would be my version of what the witness testified to, and I want to make certain that I in no way interfere with your arriving at a verdict, this is solely your authority and your function. So what you should do is ask in your note that the testimony of so-and-so be read. You might identify the subject matter and what I will do is read it back to you.

Don't tell me how you stand at any time during your deliberations, don't tell me you are 6 to 6, 10 to 2, 11 to 1. When you have arrived at a unanimous verdict, then just tell me, We have a verdict. Don't tell me that the verdict is because that is announced for the first time in open court.

When you tell me you have a verdict, I will call the jury in, I will ask the foreman

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to stand, and I will say:

In the case of the United States

against Franklin William Grassi and Raul Arce,

how do you find the defendants as to Count Two,

guilty or not guilty?

I will first go to Franklin William

Grassi and ask, How do you find Franklin William

Grassi as to Count Two, guilty or not guilty?

If you say guilty, then I won't ask you about Count One. If you say not guilty, then I will say:

How do you find the defendant Franklin William Grassi as to Count One, guilty or not guilty, and then you will give me your verdict.

Then you will sit down and I will turn to Juror Number 2 and I will say in effect:

You have heard the verdict as rendered by the foreman, is that your verdict?

And then again Juror Number 3, 4 and so forth to Juror Number 12.

If all the jurors agree in open court as to the verdict, then for the first time it becomes the verdict of the jury.

Now each juror must decide the case

for himself or herself. There are two extreme positions that are improper:

One is the juror that comes into the jury room and says in effect, Well, you decide the case and I will go along with whatever you say. They call me Agreeable Abe or any other description. That would not five the litigants a unanimous verdict of twelve jurors.

The other is the juror that comes into
the jury room and in effect says, Well, I have
already made up my mind and when the other eleven
of you come around to my way of thinking, we will
have a verdict. That intransigent, obdurate position
is obviously wrong, too.

The deliberation process is an exchange of views. Go over the evidence. There are times when you may arrive at a tentative verdict and then after going over the evidence with your fellow jurors you might be convinced that the first determination was wrong. There is nothing wrong in changing your mind if it is supported by the evidence.

I cannot think of anything else at this time.

I would ask you to take leave of
the courtroom. Don't start your deliberations,
I just want to have a talk with the lawyers,
then I will call you back into the courtroom.

The jury is excused.

or addition?

(At 12:20 p.m. the jury left the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Mr. Appleby, any exception

MR. APPLEBY: Yes, your Honor.

You will recall that Grassi never carried a gun into the bank - -

MR. SHEINBERG: Oh, I am sorry.

MR. CORBETT: That Grassi never carried a gun into the bank, but it is possible of course that he aided and abetted the assault upon the customers and employees, and unless the Government gets a charge with respect to aiding and abetting they couldn't possibly find Grassi guilty on Count One - - Count Two, excuse me.

THE COURT: All right.

Anything else?

MR. SHEINBERG: I have an exception to the charge.

THE COURT: To what part of the charge do you except to?

MR. SHEINBERG: On behalf of Raul Arce,
I respectfully except to your Honor's reading
a portion of Mr. Faison's testimony and
except to the selection of the photograph as
highlighting the testimony of a witness by the
Court, and that is the province of the jury to
deliberate on all of the testimony and such
testimony should not be highlighted by a
specific passage of testimony read by the Court.

THE COURT: I did that for a special reason, I was going to say that Mr. Faison identified the defendant in court and he picked out the defendant's photograph.

Now, I think you conceded that Government's Exhibit Number 1 was the defendant Arce, but I didn't want to say that and I remember that as it was going to the jury I said, Well, you can bring it to the jury, that is the photograph, but it isn't necessary, and it seemed to be it wasn't a definite concession and that was why I was reluctant to say that, so instead of inviting a complaint about whether it was

identified, because you made that argument when Mr. Appleby said, Let the record show he identified him, and you said it is not an identification and you made an objection, I introduced it that way.

Now, if you want to, I will do it differently and say that the witness pointed out the defendant and to just disregard what I said, and I will talk about identification testimony in that respect.

MR. SHEINBERG: No, I wouldn't want that, I don't want that, Judge.

THE COURT: This was only because you made an objection.

MR. SHEINBERG: I will withdraw my exception to that portion of the charge.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. CORBETT: Nothing else, your Honor.

THE COURT: I will give the afding and abetting charge.

Bring the jury in.

(At 12:25 p.m. the jury took its place in the jury box.)

. THE COURT: If you credit the testimony

of Mr. Garrow, the evidence that the 519

defendant Arce had a gun but that Mr. Grassi

did not, the defendant Grassi can neverthless

be convicted of the graver crime charged

in Count Two if the Government proves

beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided

and abbetted in the commission of the

graver charge.

Section 2 of Title 18 says as follows:

"Whoever commits an offense against
the United States or aids, abets, consels, commands,
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as
a principal."

Now that means that it isn't necessary

for the Government to prove that the defendant

Grassi himself committee each act that comprises

the crime charged. If he knowlingly and willfully

participated in the crime charged and thus aid

and abets in its commission, he, too, is guilty

as a principal.

Now shall I excuse the jury for any further discussion?

MR. CORBETT: No, your Honor, nothing